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 “In our reasonings concerning matter of fact, there are all imaginable degrees of 
assurance, from the highest certainty to the lowest species of moral evidence. A wise 
man, therefore, proportions his belief to the evidence.”—David Hume1 
“The confidence that individuals have in their beliefs depends mostly on the quality of 
the story they can tell about what they see, even if they see little.”—Daniel Kahneman2 
As the essays in this volume make clear, conspiracy theories vary widely in their content, the individuals 
and groups who believe in them, and in their effects on the behavior of these believers. For this reason, 
it may be difficult or impossible to come up with a completely general definition of conspiracy theory 
that captures all and only those theories that fit under this general label. Nevertheless, there are a 
significant number of conspiracy theories that share something like the following form: 
There exists a certain small group of people that share a certain characteristic such as race, 
religion, occupation, or nationality. They have secretly undertaken actions that have harmed, or 
are intended to harm, me and people like me. The fact that these actions have not generally 
been recognized is due to the conspirators’ ability to conceal evidence of this. 
Within the general scheme, there is plenty of room for variation. For example, the conspirators may be 
anonymous figures living otherwise unremarkable lives, or they may be well-known and powerful 
political, religious, or media elites. Similarly, some purported conspirators actively wish harm upon the 
believer and others—such as conspiracies positing “traitors” or “spies” working to ensure their own 
country loses some conflict—while others are held to have much more mundane motives, such as the 
desire for money or power. In this latter case, the harm in question may simply be an especially 
unpleasant side effect, though one that was foreseen by the conspirators. Finally, the harms attributed 
to the conspirators’ actions come in a number of forms. So, for example, it may be that the actions of 
the conspirators have led (or will lead) to the deaths of particular individuals, financial crises or crashes, 
military defeats, outbreaks of disease or illness, the overthrowal of the government, and so on.  
Conspiracy theories of this type all crucially involve failures of what philosophers often call inductive 
reasoning, which involves using our available evidence to determine what is probable or likely to be 
true. Inductive reasoning is usually contrasted with deductive reasoning, which involves attempts to 
prove with 100% certainty that a conclusion follows. As it turns out, inductive reasoning makes up a 
huge part of our day-to-day lives. We reason inductively, for example, when we try to determine what 
 
1 David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, ed. Eric Steinberg, 2nd ed. (Indianapolis: Hackett 
Publishing, 2011), sec. 10. 
2 Daniel Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2011), 88. 
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was the cause of some event that we just observed, or when we try to figure out what the effects of this 
same event might be. We also reason inductively any time we make predictions about the future, or 
decide whether to trust what we’ve read or heard, or make generalizations about a large population 
based on the smaller sample that we are familiar with.   
For this reason, conspiracy theories, and the errors of inductive reasoning that they exemplify, should be 
of interest to all of us. After all, if it turns out that many of the crucial errors committed by conspiracy 
theorists are ones that we ourselves are prone to, this will provide a strong reason for thinking hard 
about our own beliefs, and the process by which we have arrived at them.  
1 DON’T BELIEVE EVERYTHING YOU’RE TOLD: HUME ON MIRACLES 
Conspiracy theories often serve as simple, attractive rivals to other, more complex theories about 
politics, history, or science. So, for example, where political scientists may offer theories that tie the 
outcome of a particular election to factors such as economic conditions, demographic shifts, 
incumbency bias, and the relative appeal of the candidates’ platforms and personae, conspiracy 
theorists often see the hidden hand of conspirators as being responsible for unwelcome outcomes. 
Similarly, where mainstream medical and scientific research suggests that conditions such as autism, 
drug addiction, or obesity have complex causal backgrounds, conspiracy theorists might reply that these 
bad things are actually due to the hidden side effects of vaccines, the clandestine activities of the CIA, or 
the machinations of “Big Ag.”  
One way in which conspiracy theories are distinguished from their mainstream rivals is their method of 
origin and spread, which is often outside traditional scientific and academic channels. In the modern era, 
for example, conspiracy theories often begin in the so-called “dark corners” of the internet, as opposed 
to in peer-reviewed journal articles. They then spread, via both alternative media sources and social 
media, to larger and larger audiences. To what extent should this sort of difference in origin matter to 
the credibility of the theories in question?   
The Scottish philosopher David Hume (1711-76) takes up a very similar question in the “Of Miracles” 
section of his Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding. Hume was among the first to clearly 
distinguish between inductive and deductive reasoning, and his account of the problems inherent in 
inductive reasoning has influenced (and often troubled) scholars studying inductive reasoning ever 
since. In “Of Miracles”, Hume considers whether or not one should ever believe peoples’ accounts of 
miracles. His answer is a resounding “No!”, and many of the reasons he provides are applicable to 
conspiracy theories as well. 
Hume recognizes that the reasons people believe in miracles—because they hear or read about them 
from sources that they normally trust—are based in the same sort of inductive inference that underpins 
many of the things we believe. For example, nearly all of our beliefs about history, scientific theories, 
current events, and even the lives of our closest friends and family are, of necessity, based on what 
textbooks, teachers, newspapers, and other people tell us about these things. Because of the 
probabilistic nature of inductive inference, this means that is always possible that these sources are 
incorrect. However, we don’t normally take this possibility as grounds for dismissing everything we hear 
or read. So, what makes reports of miracles (or conspiracy theories) any different? 
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Hume provides a number of considerations for treating reports of miracles differently than other sorts 
of “testimony,” many of which are applicable to conspiracy theories. First, the chain of testimony 
supporting miracles often looks quite different than that of ordinary events. Miracles are almost 
universally said to have occurred long ago and/or in places far away, and under conditions that would 
have made it difficult or impossible for any skeptic to check on the truth of the claim. In conspiracy 
theories, by comparison, it is often held that the conspiracy theory is happening “right now!” or “under 
our noses!”. However, just as in the miracle case, it is a central part of the theory that there can be no 
possible recording/confirmation of the conspiration, since the conspirators have prevented this 
(perhaps by murdering witnesses or manipulating the media).  The fact that reports of miracles and 
conspiracy theories haven’t been and can’t be, checked out by skeptical listeners doesn’t mean that 
they are necessarily false, of course. What it does mean, however, is that these reports lack the sort of 
safeguard that comes with most testimony regarding strange or unlikely events—that is, if they were 
false, we would likely have some evidence of this. 
A second key difference Hume notes relates to the motivations of those who talk about miracles. After 
all, one reason that miracles matter so much is that they can serve as evidence for the truth of certain 
religious views. This provides a strong motivation for people who already hold these religious views to 
believe in such reports (after all, we all like being shown right!), and it also provides motivation for them 
to spread these tales, even if they don’t fully believe in them. After all, telling tales of miracles might win 
converts for the faith, or signal to other members of the group your “loyalty to the cause.” Something 
quite similar can be said of many conspiracy theories—insofar as belief in these theories is closely linked 
to membership in some group, we have good reason to doubt the impartiality of those telling tales of 
conspiracies. Finally, Hume observes that, while one might think that the sheer strangeness and 
outlandishness of miracles would make people less likely to believe and repeat them, experience shows 
that something the opposite often seems to be the case—people seem to enjoy believing and repeating 
stories about events that are utterly unlike things they have experienced themselves.  This, again, has 
close analogues with conspiracy theories. Odd as it may seem, the very claims of a conspiracy theory 
that seem the furthest detached from evidence and ordinary experience may be the claims that 
encourage its spread. 
2 MAKING MISTAKES: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 
In the generations since Hume first wrote, scholars in disciplines ranging from philosophy to economics 
to statistics to psychology have studied the nature of inductive reasoning from a variety of perspectives. 
While many of these investigations have aimed at uncovering better methods for inductive reasoning, 
others have aimed at figuring out how good ordinary humans are at inductive reasoning in a variety of 
contexts.  Most of us do well enough when the conclusions of inductive reasoning concern our 
immediate experience, for example—we learn quickly to avoid hot stoves, or to avoid drinking bottles 
labeled “poison,” but it is much less clear how successful we are when it comes to dealing with big-
picture issues regarding statistical or causal reasoning in areas such as economics, science, or politics. 
These, of course, are precisely the areas where conspiracy theorists are most prone to get things wrong. 
So, why might this be? And just how common are these errors? 
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Starting in the late 1960s, two Israeli psychologists—Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman--began 
investigating just these sorts of questions. In a series of influential articles3, they argued that humans are 
not intuitively “good statisticians,” and they make a number of systematic mistakes when engaging in 
inductive reasoning. Tversky and Kahneman’s research has had an impact far behind psychology, and in 
particular caused considerable problems for the view (once common in both economics and some areas 
of philosophy) that humans generally acted rationally.4  While Kahneman and Tversky don’t explicitly 
consider the problem of belief in conspiracy theories, their work provides a helpful framework for 
identifying and classifying many of the major inductive mistakes that conspiracy theorists make.  
A foundational concept of Kahneman and Tversky’s approach is that we make many decisions using 
intuitive heuristics, or simple rules for making inductive decisions. In particular, they suggest that, when 
we are faced with making a complex decision, we often (without realizing it) “substitute” a simpler, 
easier-to-answer question, and answer that instead. And while this may work well enough in many day-
to-day cases, it can also easily lead to fallacious reasoning of the sort exemplified in conspiracy theories.  
3 THE STORY JUST “FITS”: THE REPRESENTATIVENESS HEURISTIC 
Conspiracy theories often begin with the intuition that some bad event—a recession, an outbreak of a 
disease in the local community, or a school shooting—cannot be adequately explained by any 
combination of normal causal processes discussed by scientists, public health officials, or psychologists 
and sociologists. They then conclude that this event must have been caused by a carefully planned 
process (instigated in secret by the conspirators!) that was designed to result in just this sort of 
outcome. This way of reasoning exemplifies what Kahneman and Tversky label the representativeness 
heuristic, in which the probability of a certain process P causing event E is judged solely by the 
“resemblance” between P and E and NOT by any careful consideration of how probable it was that P 
actually occurred, or the potential alternatives to P, or even how good of evidence for P we happen to 
have.  
In the case of conspiracy theories, the representativeness heuristic might explain several inductive 
failures. First, it accounts for the way conspiracy theorists often seem to ignore the comparative base 
rates of “bad things caused by a combination of ordinary factors” versus “bad things caused by powerful 
secret organizations working in secret to cause just this sort of harm in each and every gory detail.” 
While the resemblance heuristic pushes us toward the conspiracy story (since it better “resembles” the 
bad thing in question), this is a bad inference. After all, the vast, vast majority of the harms that we in 
incur in life are NOT the result of explicit conspiracies intended to cause this exact outcome, but instead 
are the result of perfectly mundane causal factors acting in combination (that is, plain old “bad luck”). 
For similar reasons, the representativeness heuristic can plausibly account for conspiracy theorist’s 
tendency to posit highly specific causes for events that are better explained by appeal to statistics. So, 
for example, small samples are more variable than large samples, and so we should be very careful in 
drawing conclusions based on what we have observed in small samples, even if the sample in question 
 
3See especially “Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases,” Science 185, no. 4157 (1974): 1124–1131; 
“Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk,” Econometrica 47, no. 2 (1979): 263–292. A good summary 
of both their work and related research is provided in Kahneman’s Thinking, Fast and Slow (2011). 
4 In 2002, Kahneman won the Nobel Prize in Economics for this work. Unfortunately, Tversky died in 1996. 
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seems odd to us. So, for example, if two people in a small office of ten people each have a heart attack 
during the same month, this might seem unusual, but it doesn’t provide strong evidence the office 
coffee has secretly been poisoned by management seeking to save money on future pensions. By 
contrast, if 200 people in an office of 1,000 people suffer such attacks in a month (the same percent, but 
a much larger sample), this really does suggest something out of the ordinary is going on. However, in 
practice, conspiracy theorists (along with the rest of us) systematically overlook this difference in sample 
size, and too often jump to conclusions on the basis of small samples. 
 For similar reasons, the confidence we have in our conclusions about the causes of events ought to 
reflect the strength and variety of evidence that we have seen—after all, it is surely better to read ten 
high-quality journal articles and one moderately plausible social media post about a conspiracy theory 
than just the moderately plausible blog post. However, the representativeness heuristic (which ignores 
quantity or quality of evidence and cares only about its “fit” with a theory) can lead us to ignore this 
and, in some cases, to feel more confident in our conspiracy theory after reading just the social media 
post, since there are no additional sources to interfere with the nice clean fit between this story and our 
believing in the truth of the theory it describes. Basically, once we decide to give the social media post 
any credence whatsoever—as opposed to simply dismissing it out of hand—it can be very difficult to not 
overweight its value as evidence. 
4 PROBLEMS WITH PROBABILITIES: PROSPECT THEORY 
The decision to adopt a conspiracy theory can be thought of as a sort of “bet” about the way the world 
will turn out, and what the “winning strategy” for living in such a world will be. So, for example, if I 
suspect there is a good chance that the members of the US Federal Reserve Board are an evil cabal 
intent on crashing the world economy to enhance the wealth of their corporate masters, I might buy 
gold and bury it in my back yard to hedge against this. If I assign a significant probability that 
pharmaceutical companies have hidden the evidence of vaccines causing autism, I might not vaccinate 
my children. Finally, if I believe it likely that some suspect group of people is up to no good, I might take 
action against them, potentially including violence.  
Most of us would like to think that we are good at making such bets, since they are crucial to making 
decisions about how we invest our money, vote, and generally lead our lives. So, for example, it seems 
obvious that a 1% risk of a bad outcome is different than a 5% chance, which is in turn different from a 
50% chance or 95% chance, and our choices and actions should reflect this difference. Unfortunately, 
according to Kahneman and Tversky, this is not how we actually make these sorts of decisions. Instead, 
we get things wrong in a number of ways. 
First, we tend to focus not on the relative merits of a set of outcomes, but on how we think of ourselves 
as having arrived at these outcomes, and whether we view them as “gains” or “losses” from a 
psychological baseline. As it turns out, we care much more about potential losses than we do about 
potential gains, and simultaneously don’t care as much about the relative size of these gains or losses as 
we should. Conspiracy theorists offer excellent examples of this. First, in cases where they weigh large 
potential benefits from a change versus (much smaller) potential losses, they can be highly risk averse, 
for example when they reject the large potential benefits of vaccines or GMO foods on the grounds that 
there might be hidden health risks associated with these. Second, in cases where the conspiracy 
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theorists already feel that they are below some psychological baseline, they can instead become risk-
seeking, and adopt conspiracy theories that lead to highly risky actions in a last-ditch attempt to put 
themselves back  over the baseline, even though the most probable outcome of such behavior would be 
to put them even further under this baseline than they already feel themselves to be. So, for example, if 
the members of a certain group worry they are “losing control of their country” to their political rivals, 
they might respond by abandoning democratic norms or engaging in violence, even though these 
actions are, on balance, likely to lead to even greater losses. 
Prospect theory also suggests that we systematically underweight the probabilities of some events while 
overweighting others. In particular, while we sometimes tend to treat extremely unlikely but possible 
events as being equal to 0, we quickly inflate the probabilities of unlikely events once we begin to treat 
them as being genuinely possible, no matter how “objectively” unlikely they might be. In the case of 
conspiracy theories, this might plausibly explain the simultaneous urge to (1) dismiss out-of-hand the 
possibility that the harms that have occurred to them are due to statistical “chance”, and (2) vastly 
inflate the probability that these harms are caused by the secret actions of conspirators.  
5 CAN WE AVOID MISTAKES WHEN IT COUNTS? 
So, what’s the take-away from all of this? It might be summarized as follows: conspiracy theorists, like 
the rest of us, notice bad things happening in the world around them. They (again, like the rest of us) are 
convinced that there must be a cause for these events. However, when they begin to consider what sort 
of cause this might be, they are led astray by the resemblance heuristic, which predisposes them 
towards a causal story (the conspiracy theory) that most closely “resembles” the limited samples they 
are familiar with, and the limited, biased evidence they have reviewed. This completely ignores the 
possibility that the events in question are simply the result of statistical “chance.” These errors are 
compounded by the failure to deal with probabilities and “risky decisions” properly, as described by 
prospect theory. Conspiracy theorists are often attached to some (perhaps imaginary) baseline about 
the way things “used to be” or the way “nature intended things,” and are willing to take risks to avoid 
accepting losses from this baseline. Simultaneously, they improperly dismiss the possibility of some 
unlikely events (such as the sorts of chancy processes that often explain strange-looking results in small 
samples) and the inflate the probability of others (such as the conspiracy theory they’ve heard so much 
about on talk radio).   
In Thinking, Fast and Slow, Kahneman argues there are other heuristics and biases waiting to trip us up, 
beyond those described here. The halo effect, for example, predisposes us to (without any evidence!) 
assign good qualities to people/things we already believe are good in other respects, and bad qualities 
to those we already dislike or distrust.  Outcome bias, meanwhile, presents us with a false view of the 
past, whereby we assume that the things that did happen (for good or bad) were predictable. This 
conveniently allows us to avoid giving credit to decision makers for decisions that turned out well while 
blaming them for decisions that went wrong. These sorts of processes plausibly lend fuel to the fire of 
conspiracy theorists’ tendency to blame any and all bad outcomes on the actions of the purported 
conspirators (who, not coincidentally, tend to belong to groups the theory’s proponents already hold in 
ill regard). Finally, and perhaps most concerning our intuitive sense of how likely a given outcome is 
strongly affected by the detail in which one have imagined or described this outcome. So, the mere act 
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of talking or reading about a conspiracy theory in detail might well serve to inflate our sense of how 
probable this sort of really thing is. 
All of this happens generally happens without even thinking, and it can happen to even smart, 
knowledgeable people, since inductive fallacies don’t present themselves as defective means of 
reasoning. Instead, these processes present themselves as a strong feeling that certain theories or ideas 
are correct, and invite us to adopt and defend these ideas as our own with all of the intellectual 
creativity and rigor that we can muster. This suggests that that vulnerability to conspiracy theories may 
be linked to neither ignorance nor stupidity. Rather, it might be that conspiracy theorists are mentally 
“lazy” in the ways that many of us are lazy, and it is this laziness that undercuts their ability to make 
cogent inductive inferences. In particular, belief in a conspiracy theory allows one to avoid all sorts of 
uncomfortable thoughts, such as fully grappling with the role of chance in events, or the poverty and 
bias of the news we consume, or the systematic ways in which our sense of what’s possible misleads us 
about what is actually probable. Conspiracy theories reassure us that the bad guys really are all bad, and 
that, if we stop them next time, we can assure things will turn out well. 
If correct, this suggests that there can be significant value in reflecting on the inductive failures of 
conspiracy theorists, even for those who feel quite confident that they themselves could never fall into 
the trap of believing in such a theory. Such confidence, as it turns out, may be a poor guide to one’s 
actual vulnerability. However, it may be that we can partially inoculate ourselves against conspiracy 
theories by paying close attention to the specific ways in which they exemplify bad inductive reasoning. 
This, in turn, might make it at least somewhat easier to catch our own errors, and to become better, 
more careful inductive reasoners5.  
 
 
5 I’d like to thank Todd Kukla for his helpful comments. 
